Evidence issuance, end to end

This page describes how Registry Notary turns typed request inputs and a configured claim into a signed evaluation or verifiable credential. It is an explanation, not a how-to: there are no commands here. For commands, see the Registry Notary documentation and the Registry Stack project authoring guide.

Why issue credentials at all

Programs and services need to know whether a person qualifies for something. The classic way to answer that question is to demand records: birth certificates, land titles, tax statements. The records carry far more information than the answer requires, the records live in registries the program does not own, and the records cross trust boundaries every time a copy moves. A credential lets a registry answer one question (does this subject satisfy this rule) without shipping the records that justify the answer. Registry Notary is the component that produces those credentials.

In the three-party credential model, Registry Notary is the issuer: it evaluates a configured claim from compiler-pinned Relay outputs or permitted self-attestation, applies the disclosure policy, and signs an SD-JWT VC. A wallet is the holder: it stores the credential, presents fields selectively, and proves key possession. A verifier is the relying party: it checks the issuer signature, reads the presented fields, and applies its own program policy. What Notary produces is evidence, a signed receipt that a claim was evaluated; the decision (whether the subject qualifies for a benefit) belongs to the program, not to Notary.

The claim model in one diagram

A single claim evaluation moves through five stages.

Registry Stack project authoring makes each stage concrete. An evidence service declares typed request inputs, compiler-pinned consultations, claims over the closed consultation or self-attestation inputs, disclosure modes, and optional credential profiles. Product and source version labels record interoperability evidence. They do not select a Relay capability or script runtime.

Four ways to consume an evaluation

There is one claim model and four transports a caller can use to land a credential, delegated evaluation, or receipt.

1. Direct API. The caller calls POST /v1/evaluations to evaluate the claim, then POST /v1/credentials to materialize an SD-JWT VC from the stored evaluation. The caller is a backend (a program registry, a benefits portal) that holds a Registry Notary API key or an OIDC token. The credential ends up wherever the calling backend chooses to send it.
2. OID4VCI offer flow. The caller is a wallet, not a backend. Registry Notary publishes /.well-known/openid-credential-issuer so the wallet learns the credential endpoint, the nonce endpoint, and the supported credential configurations. The wallet (or a portal acting on the wallet’s behalf) fetches a CredentialOffer from GET /oid4vci/credential-offer, the user authenticates at the configured authorization server, the wallet calls POST /oid4vci/nonce to get a c_nonce, signs a proof-of-possession JWT with its did:jwk key, and posts the bearer access token plus the proof to POST /oid4vci/credential. The choreography is implemented in the Notary server’s API module at crates/registry-notary-server/src/api.rs. The offer can carry an authorization-code grant (the user authenticates at the authorization server, as in the authorization-code grant) or a pre-authorized-code grant; the hosted lab uses pre-authorized-code with eSignet (an open-source identity and e-signature platform) as the authorization server.
3. Verifiable receipt only. The caller does not need a credential at all. It calls POST /v1/evaluations, accepts the disclosure mode the claim allows (often predicate or redacted), and stores the audit-stamped result. Every evaluation, credential or not, is recorded in the JSONL audit log alongside verification_id and claim_hash for redacted results.
4. Federated delegated evaluation. The caller is another configured Registry Notary. It posts a compact signed JWT to POST /federation/v1/evaluations; the serving Notary verifies peer policy, replay state, purpose, profile, and audience before claim evaluation, then returns a compact signed JWT response. Federation profiles are source-free in this version and cannot select a registry_backed claim. This path returns a scoped evaluation result, not a credential.

The credential tour citizen self-attestation scenario uses path 2: eSignet provides the access token, Notary evaluates the permitted authenticated context without a registry source, and a wallet completes the OID4VCI flow.

Selective disclosure properties

Selective disclosure is the property that distinguishes an SD-JWT VC from a plain JWT. The credential format is the IETF SD-JWT VC draft’s application/dc+sd-jwt media type, with dc+sd-jwt as the JWT typ header; the implementation tracks the draft family’s current media type rather than pinning a numbered draft revision, and the standards register records the claim as a profiled subset. Three mechanics make selective disclosure work.

• Per-field disclosures. Registry Notary wraps each claim field in its own SD-JWT disclosure blob. The signed credential body carries the SHA-256 digest of every disclosure, not the disclosure value. The holder chooses which disclosures to present to which verifier; the unselected fields stay hidden.
• SHA-256 digests. The digest list is what the credential’s signature covers. A verifier checks the signature, recomputes the digest of every presented disclosure, and confirms each digest appears in the signed list. There is no way for a holder to mint a disclosure that was not in the original credential.
• Holder binding via did:jwk. The credential’s cnf claim names the holder’s public key as a did:jwk. To present the credential, the holder must produce a fresh signed proof from that key, audience-bound to the verifier. A stolen credential without the matching private key is not presentable. Holder binding is the default: a credential profile that omits holder_binding binds with did:jwk, and issuing an unbound, bearer-style credential requires an explicit holder_binding.mode: none. This has been the default since v0.8.4, and registry-notary doctor warns on a profile that opts out (notary.credential_profile.unbound_holder_binding).

Evidence: the v0.8.4 Notary changelog records the default, and the configuration loader applies it.

The doctor diagnostic is covered by the doctor CLI test.

Where this fits with Relay

Registry Notary is an independently deployable HTTP service. A Notary-only deployment supports source-free and self-attested claims. Registry-backed claims require Registry Relay, and a combined deployment calls Relay through the compiler-pinned consultation contract.

Registry Relay surfaces evidence-offering metadata under /metadata/evidence-offerings/{id}. The metadata document points at a Registry Notary instance, names the claim ids the offering covers, and describes the supported disclosure modes and formats. A consumer that finds an offering on Relay learns where to call Notary. Relay owns registry source access and typed consultation outputs; Notary owns claim semantics, disclosure, and credential issuance.

For delegated evaluation, Registry Manifest can also publish federation and evaluation_profiles metadata. That metadata helps a partner configure a static peer relationship. Runtime access still comes from the serving Notary federation.peers policy, signed request verification, and replay checks.

Boundaries

A few things Registry Notary is not.

• Not an eligibility decision. The verification receipt is an evidence artifact. The issuing program, not Registry Notary, converts a verified claim into an entitlement, a payment, or a benefit.
• Not a wallet. Registry Notary issues credentials. The wallet that stores, presents, and unlocks them is a separate component, owned by the holder.
• Not a credential authority. The DID, the verification key, the credential profile config, and the relationship to the relying party belong to the deployment, not to Registry Notary as a product. Registry Notary ships an engine and a wire shape; the trust comes from the deployment.
• Not open federation. The MVP accepts only statically configured peers and delegated evaluation. Federated credential issuance and dynamic trust-chain discovery are not implemented.

Next

• Registry Notary overview
• Glossary