Registry stack documentation: machine-readable Markdown.
Index of all pages: https://docs.registrystack.org/llms.txt
Full corpus: https://docs.registrystack.org/llms-full.txt

# Security self-assessment

> A CNCF TAG Security-style self-assessment for Registry Stack.

This is a CNCF TAG Security-style self-assessment. Registry Stack is not
currently a CNCF project, is not in the CNCF donation track, and has not been
reviewed by CNCF TAG Security. This document is maintainer self-assessment
against that public guide.

## Metadata

| Field | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Project | Registry Stack |
| Repository | [registrystack/registry-stack](https://github.com/registrystack/registry-stack) |
| Assessment type | Maintainer self-assessment |
| Review history | No public review ledger yet |
| Last reviewed | 2026-06-24 |

## Overview

Registry Stack helps operators publish governed registry-facing services over
data they already hold. The two main runtime patterns are protected registry
APIs through Registry Relay and governed evidence responses through Registry
Notary.

The public architecture, boundary model, and product roles are documented in
[Architecture](../../explanation/architecture/) and
[Boundaries and map](../../map/boundaries-and-map/). The cross-cutting security
requirements are documented in [RS-SEC-G](../../spec/rs-sec-g/).

## Self-assessment use

This assessment helps reviewers find public evidence quickly. It is not a
certification, penetration test, production deployment proof, or CNCF review.
The hosted lab is a synthetic-data behavior demo and does not prove production
operational assurance.

## Security functions and features

Registry Stack security behavior is split between software guarantees and
operator responsibilities.

Software guarantees include:

- OIDC token validation through shared platform primitives.
- Request-scope authorization and policy checks before protected reads or
  governed evidence evaluation.
- Disclosure controls that can return narrower evidence instead of source
  records.
- Credential issuance for configured Notary surfaces, including SD-JWT VC
  issuance where configured.
- Hash-chained audit records emitted by runtime services.
- Release workflow support for public checksums, keyless cosign signatures for
  GitHub Release assets, image digests, image SBOMs, Grype vulnerability
  reports, and generated release capsules after the first capsule-producing
  release run.

Operator responsibilities include:

- choosing and protecting signing-key storage;
- configuring trusted issuers, audiences, scopes, and peer relationships;
- retaining audit records in storage appropriate for the deployment's integrity
  and retention needs;
- reviewing vulnerability scan results and deployment-specific exposure before
  production use.

## Project compliance

Registry Stack documents standards alignment in [Standards](../standards/) and
the public spec register in [Specifications](../../spec/). These pages describe
implementation evidence and known gaps; they do not claim legal compliance by
themselves.

## Secure development practices

Development evidence:

- CI runs Rust format, workspace checks, focused tests, release-tool tests, lab
  source-model checks, and docs checks.
- OpenSSF Scorecard runs on the root workflow and publishes default-branch
  results as hygiene telemetry.
- Release manifests pin source refs and external inputs.
- Release validation checks source tag matching, source-ref ancestry, default
  branch reachability, and manifest consistency.
- Release capsules are generated from workflow evidence rather than hand-written
  prose.
- GitHub Release assets are signed by the root release workflow with keyless
  cosign. Tag-triggered releases produced by the current workflow also publish
  release-level SLSA provenance. The public verification process is documented in
  [`release/VERIFY.md`](https://github.com/registrystack/registry-stack/blob/main/release/VERIFY.md).

Known release-integrity gaps:

- OCI image signatures are not yet published for root monorepo releases.
- Existing releases produced before the provenance workflow change may not
  include release-level SLSA provenance assets.
- Public claims about signing are scoped to the release asset or product
  surface that actually performs signing.

## Security issue resolution

Report vulnerabilities through
[`SECURITY.md`](https://github.com/registrystack/registry-stack/blob/main/SECURITY.md).
The project publishes public review-ledger entries only when they are fixed and
public, or when an open theme is already publicly inferable and approved for
publication by the security reviewer.

No public review ledger yet.

## Appendix

Primary public evidence:

- [RS-SEC-G](../../spec/rs-sec-g/)
- [Contracts](../contracts/)
- [OpenSSF evidence](../openssf-evidence/)
- [Registry Notary API reference](../apis/registry-notary/)
- [Registry Relay API reference](../apis/registry-relay/)
- GitHub Release assets, with generated release capsules after the first
  capsule-producing release run
- [Release verification](https://github.com/registrystack/registry-stack/blob/main/release/VERIFY.md)